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Abstract
We use a 2-country model to analyze fiscal and monetary interactions in a Monetary union.
Both countries are integrated and experience spillovers from their partners’ fiscal policies. We
solve for Monetary Leadership - the Central Bank commits to an inflation target and the fiscal
policymakers optimize spending - and for Fiscal Leadership - the Central Bank chooses its pre-
ferred rate given exogenously defined fiscal policies. High inflation aversion and small output
gaps in one country can generate overspending in their integrated partners. Country weights
determined by the Central Bank affect its policy making by overlooking smaller countries.
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1 Motivation
”(...) it hardly appears within the realm of political feasibility that national currencies would ever
be abandoned in favor of any other arrangement” - Robert Mundell
The adoption of the Euro by its first 11 members, in January 1999, was a pivotal moment in mod-
ern European history. It was the culmination of an important process of reintegration that started
50 years prior, with the end of World War II. However, and despite the decisive symbolic weight
of adopting a common currency, its political relevance has not implied deeper fiscal policy coordi-
nation, nor a debate over how monetary and fiscal policies can overcome enduring heterogeneities
and asymmetries in the Euro: while the Maastricht Treaty did little to tackle structural differences
between member states (De Grauwe (1996) and Afxentiou (2000) discuss the effectiveness of the
simple nominal convergence criteria required by the document), the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) restrained the use of fiscal policy by imposing constraints on deficit levels and debt accumu-
lation (Buiter et al. (1993)). The resulting policy environment is made up of several intrinsically
different economies with little flexibility to handle idiosyncratic shocks (Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1992)) - as Bergsten (2012) eloquently wrote, the Euro was Europe’s ”half-built house”.
After a decade of almost stagnant growth from some Euro members, during which several
countries transgressed the SGP’s 3% budget-deficit limit (most times with no formal or informal
consequence), the Eurozone witnessed a dramatic sovereign debt crisis, when Greece, Portugal and
Ireland stood at risk of insolvency. The policy response to the crisis was itself severely criticized: on
the one hand, due to the lag with which the ECB committed to crucial non-conventional policies; on
the other hand, due to the brutal austerity measures that caused recessions, increased unemployment
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and overall degraded living standards in intervened countries. The enduring disparities amongst
member-states suggested that Europe was travelling at different speeds: a fast-growing North, the
creditors, and a slower South, the debtors. The idea was not new: in 1994, ex-German finance
minister Wolfgang Shäuble published a document (Reflections on European Policy) calling for the
creation of a Kernereuropa or core Europe. With the divisiveness brought upon by the sovereign
debt crisis, many in Europe now see the multi-speed reform as a necessity. In 2017, even Jean-
Claude Junker, former president of the European commission known for his pro-integration views,
hinted a multi-speed Europe as part of a 5 year plan for 2025. Luque et al. (2014) develop a
model showing how, in the wake of the increased volatility spurred by the sovereign debt crisis, the
options have moved to the extremes: either full-on fiscal integration or a move towards independent
policy-making.
In order to understand what drives fiscal-monetary equilibria in a context of asymmetry and
real integration, we investigate the behaviour of an independent central bank with monetary author-
ity over 2 countries. The governments of each economy decide on their desired level of spending
(deficit or superavit), with a possible impact on output. The central bank (CB), on the other hand,
observes each decision and sets its chosen monetary policy through a given level of inflation that
we assume it can produce. In our 2-country model, we add a coefficient that mimics the level of
real integration between both countries, translating into an economic spillover effect. Countries are
differently weighed by the CB, accounting for asymmetric policy responses.
The 3 players act according to a social loss function, which is positive in inflation and in
the output-gap. We allow social preferences regarding the inflation/output-gap trade-off to vary,
resulting in heterogeneity between countries and in their relation towards the CB. Finally, we hold
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debt to be welfare decreasing for each country: the effect is proportional to the deficit level chosen
by the government and weighed by a coefficient that captures the overall cost of indebtment.
We mostly follow Dixit and Lambertini (2003b), the first true attempt to accommodate fiscal-
monetary interactions in a Monetary Union with the dynamic inconsistency of low inflation mon-
etary policy (Kydland and Prescott (1977)). They conclude that, in an n country framework, an
equilibrium with output gap=0 and inflation=0 is attainable without fiscal coordination. Although
heterogeneity was considered in the model, no particular analysis of it was studied. Earlier, Dixit
and Lambertini (2003a) relax the n country framework but neglect the effects of integration by
using a one-country model. By using 2 countries and acknowledging heterogeneity, both in social
preferences and at the economic level, we hope to shed light on some institutional design flaws
in the European Monetary Union (EMU), particularly in Monetary Policy setting and fiscal con-
straints. We also address the possible benefits and drawbacks of increased economic integration.
The analysis of the model will be divided in two parts: firstly, we will assume that the CB
commits to a given value for inflation and both countries respond using fiscal policies (Monetary
Leadership). Secondly, we will assume that the CB acts after the decision of both countries (Fiscal
Leadership), taking both values for fiscal policies as given and providing its own best response.
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2 Literature Review
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kennen et al. (1969) pioneered the study of currency areas
- a preamble to any monetary union - by presenting the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) crite-
ria, a set of rules which would define if a given region could optimize economic performance by
using a single currency. At the heart of Mundell’s analysis was a strong emphasis: the gains in re-
duced transaction costs and free capital flows should be offset against the expected loss of monetary
authority and currency flexibility. In the absence of sufficiently flexible prices or high labour mo-
bility, and considering the existence of asymmetric shocks, Mundell and his associates concluded
that only strong fiscal ties could ensure optimality in a given currency area.
Regarding monetary policy setting, most literature considers the problem of time-inconsistency
in low-inflation scenarios (a framework which is particularly close to modern, independent and
inflation-averse Central Banks). Kydland and Prescott (1977) as well as Barro and Gordon (1983)
firstly suggested that equilibrium values of money growth and inflation were smaller in a regime
with commitment rather than a discretionary one. The expected benefits of surprise inflation can
only work if agents are effectively surprised; if such behavior persists, expectations are readjusted
and policy effects are hindered.
Rogoff (1985) followed up on this work by proposing the dynamic inconsistency of a low-
inflation monetary policy - low inflation implies low marginal cost of additional inflation, which
will induce policymakers to pursue expansionary policies; but since this is public knowledge, eco-
nomic agents will increase inflationary expectations and thwart such a policy. His proposed solution
for this problem, along the lines of Romer (2006)’s simplification, would be to delegate monetary
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policy to an authority which could give a higher relative weight to inflation than the public (con-
sidering the inflation-output trade-off). This conclusion has been generally accepted ever since - as
such, most central banks in developed economies are statutorily independent and more prone for
inflation-aversion (i.e. conservative in the sense of Rogoff (1985) and Svensson (1997)). Alesina
and Tabellini (1987) later showed that the time inconsistency of monetary policy is due to tax dis-
tortions. Changes in monetary policy affect the amount of debt that can be seignoraged by the fiscal
authority. Therefore, a change in monetary policy will almost always be accompanied by a change
in the fiscal stance, with an expected impact in output.
With respect to fiscal policy, most literature has focused on the desirability of fiscal constrains
in a monetary union. Chari and Kehoe (2007) argue that fiscal constrains are only beneficial if the
monetary authority cannot commit to its policies. In this case, there may be an interest of each fiscal
authority to inflate their debt and export part of it as common inflation - in which case the central
bank would act discretionarily to avoid a surge in inflation. Buiter et al. (1993) also supported the
idea that the Maastricht treaty would require ”an excessive degree of fiscal retrenchment” causing
”negative consequences for economic activity”.
The debate on the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy within a monetary union was
largely held in the late 90’s and early 2000’s. Dixit and Lambertini developed the theoretical
grounds for the discussion: the basis were Gordon-Barro type models, extended to several coun-
tries as to incorporate different fiscal policies with crossed externalities. Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b) show that the ideal output and inflation levels can be achieved without the need for an
ultraconservative central bank only if both authorities agree on those same levels. Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2003a) relaxed the assumption that bliss levels are agreed upon. They concluded that the
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ideal inflation and output levels can be achieved if fiscal policy is discretionary and the central
bank commits to a monetary policy rule or if given monetary leadership with fiscal and monetary
discretion. While the aforementioned works attempt to show if specific equilibrium are possible
in each interaction, our investigation intends to analyse how factors of heterogeneity influence the
each equilibrium.
The issue of economic integration in the context of a monetary union still inspires ambigu-
ous results. In an attempt to prove that the Europe was still far from an optimum currency area,
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) compared European countries to US reagions and proved that,
with the exception of Germany and its close neighbours, European countries were more susceptible
to idiosyncratic shocks than US states. Adjustment speeds in Europe were also slower, allegedly
due to lower factor mobility. Krugman (1993) similarly argued that increased integration leads
to a higher degree of specialization, rendering business cycles less symmetric. On the contrary,
Frankel and Rose (1998) show that increased integration leads to stronger trade links, which, in
the medium-run, increase symmetry in macroeconomic fluctuations. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001)
emphasized the weaker correlation in business cycles when considering strongly integrated capital
markets, in a study performed across US states and OECD countries. Soares et al. (2011) later
added that business cycle synchronization (a strong proxy for integration) is statistically insignifi-
cant in peripheral European countries (i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Finland) - supporting the
claim that economic integration in Europe did not particularly pick up after the Euro.
Still on heterogeneity, Luque et al. (2014) study how it may be rational to establish a currency
union prior to a fiscal one. The authors argue on how increased economic volatility may imply a
polarization of positions in a currency union, provoking a choice of either full fiscal integration or
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a return to independent policy-making.
Finally, Pereira and Tavares (2019) develop a counterfactual exercise to extract the implicit
weights that the Central Bank assigns to each country in its policy decisions. Results clearly show
that the economic relevance of each economy is not the only driver considered by the CB. Countries
with smaller weights are the least correlated with Germany’s business cycle.
3 The Model
We use a log-linearized adaptation of a Barro-Gordon type model (Barro and Gordon (1983)),
similar to the one found in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b), to address fiscal-monetary equilibria in






i − yi)2 +
1
2
π2 + 2βixi (1)
Equation (1) represents the Social Loss Function of each country. Both are positive in in-
flation and in the output gap (y∗i − ȳi) . θi captures the degree of social preference regarding the
output gap/inflation differential. A higher θi translates into a higher preference for output stabiliza-
tion, where a small θi means inflation aversion. Since we model inflation as welfare-reducing for
both countries, θi > 0. At the country level, we linearly add a coefficient βi intended to capture
the welfare-reducing effects of distortionary taxation (either present of future) needed to finance
present spending.
The existence of a higher desired level of output (y∗i ) results from monopolistic competition,
which generates inefficiencies at an economic level (Dixit and Lambertini (2003b)). It should,
therefore, be desirable to eliminate such distortions, which is why we postulate for the minimization
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of this difference (y∗i−ȳi) as welfare improving. For the purpose of this investigation, this difference













The monetary authority, on the other hand, has to act over a weighed average of each coun-
try’s output gap (Equation (2)). To do so, we add a coefficient (λi) as to represent the political
weight that the CB attributes to each country 1. This value may or may not be proportional to the
economic size of the country. The CB may have an interest in inflating the economy, should the
benefit (higher GDP) compensate the loss (higher inflation). We hold that the central bank’s prefer-
ences regarding this trade-off are more conservative (in the sense of Rogoff, 1985a and Svensson,
1997) than at a national level. The algebra and conclusions of the model work well considering
both cases.
Output in both countries is described by the following function:
yi = ȳi + ajixj + aiixi + c(π − πe), i = 1, 2 (3)
GDP will depart from its natural level (ȳi) and change according to spillover effects from
integration (aijxj) and the multiplier effect of fiscal policy (aiixi). Expansionary fiscal policy -
deficit - is given by a xi > 0, and affects output positively, influenced by the multiplier aii. Since we
do not directly consider population in our model, the values for output (y∗i , ȳi, yi) and for spending
(xi) are given in Per Capita terms.
The magnitude of cross-border effects, proportional to the degree of integration along the
lines of Corsetti et al. (2009), is weighed by aij - the spillover of country i to country j. We add
1λ1 + λ2 = 1
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that the multiplier effect of fiscal policy will always be greater than the coefficient of integration
(aii > aji, aij∀aii,aji).
We further admit that surprise inflation has a positive effect on GDP. The reactivity of output
to the inflation differential is captured by c. The Central Bank can, therefore, inflate the economy
to increase output in both countries. This is the only channel through which the CB can impact the
equilibrium.
4 Monetary Leadership
The timing of events is as follows:
t=0 t=1 t=2
In t=0, agents form expectations on inflation (πe). In t=1, the CB commits π = π0. In t=2 both
countries respond by choosing their own fiscal policy stances (xi), assuming that of their integrated
partner (xj) and the level of inflation (π0).













yi = ȳi + ajixj + aiixi + c(π − πe), i = 1, 2
π = π0
FOC for Country 1 yield:
2β1 + θ1a11(x1a11 + ȳ1 − y∗1 + x2a21 + c(π0 − πe)) = 0
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Which can be simplified to:
Country 2 undergoes the same process, yielding
x2 =





Equations (4) and (5) are the fiscal best responses for countries 1 and 2, respectively. They show,
in a (x2,x1) space.
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Figure 1: Best Response functions
Point A in figure 1 shows the Nash equilibrium values for spending (x2N , x1N ). The functions
are the result of a small calibration of the model, assuming: aii > 1, aij < 1, θi > 0.
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
The results provide 2 best response functions, where each country decides on the appropriate stance
on fiscal policy considering the spillover effects from the integrated union partner. Our analysis will
focus on country 1, given that country 2 reacts symmetrically.
As expected, an increase in spending from country 2 has a negative effect country 1’s de-
cision to spend (∂x1
∂x2
)2. As long as both countries are integrated (a21 6= 0), an increase in x2 will
lead to a decrease in x1 (and vice-versa). Since spending has a cost (measured by the coefficient
2The analysis made in sections 4.1, 5.1 and Conclusion are under the ceteris paribus proviso, if nothing else is said.
For simplicity and to save space, this remark is made only once.
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βi, intended to represent the distortionary effects of taxation and its subsequent welfare decreas-
ing effect), countries prefer to absorb the positive externality associated with the spillover-effect
(measured by the terms aij) rather than engage in their own fiscal policies.
Similarly, an increase in integration has a negative effect on own-country spending ( ∂x1
∂a21
< 0)
as reflected in Figure 4 (see annex). Increased integration means bigger spillovers, which reduce
the need for fiscal expansion. The bigger the increase in integration, the larger will be the decrease
in spending. A simultaneous increase in the coefficients of integration (a12 and a21) will have
beneficial effects for both countries only if they are of a similar magnitude. (Fig. 5, see annex). By
increasing mutual spillover effects, the need for debt fuelled expansions is reduced.
Naturally, own-country spending decreases with an increase in the cost of debt (∂x1
∂β1
< 0) and
increases with an increase in the natural output gap ( ∂x1
∂(y∗1−ȳ1)
> 0).
Figure 6 shows the effect on x1 and x2 of an increase in country 1’s output gap. As expected,
spending in country 1 will increase and spending in country 2 will decrease less-than proportionally
(due to the spillover effect).
A change in the fiscal multiplier also affects spending in the following way ( ∂x1
∂a11
>< 0)
which is generally positive. When (y1 − ȳ1 − x2a21) is negative (or 0), an increase in the fiscal
multiplier will enhance the efficiency of spending, consequently leading to a larger gap (which we
model to be welfare reducing). For this reason, when the gap is negative or 0, an increase in a11 will
induce a decrease in spending. Similarly, a sufficiently high cost of debt (4β1 > (y1− ȳ1− x2a21))
can have an identical effect.
Finally, the degree of inflation aversion (θi) also affects the equilibrium solution. A decrease




> 0). Figure 7 represents the change in equilibrium with an increase in θ1
Since output in both countries is affected by the inflation differential, so are the fiscal policy
stances. As such, the best response of both countries to an increase in surprise inflation will gen-
erally be a decrease in expenditure ( ∂x1
∂(π0−πe) > 0). Figure 6 represents the effect of an increase in
surprise inflation. The CB can, therefore, induce growth in both economies by choosing a rate such










Figure 2: Effect in x1 and x2 of an increase in surprise inflation (π0−πe). Equilibrium moves from
point A to point B.
Equations (6) and (7) show the Nash equilibrium values for spending. It may be interesting
to explore the effect of changes in inflation aversion in the equilibrium solution: ∂x1N
∂θ2
< 0. The
result is generally negative since a11, a22 > 1 and a12, a21 < 1, which means that an increase in
inflation aversion for country 2 (decrease θ2) positively impacts spending in country 1. This means
13
that a small θ2 can generate consecutively high values for x1.
Considering the framework of our model, fiscal decisions in a large economy - which we
will define as one with high crossed-spillovers ( aij) - are extremely important, since they have
a strong effect on its integrated partners. If such a country (let’s say country 1) has persistently
high inflation aversion (small θi), spending will be severely curbed, generating fewer spillovers
to its integrated partner, and ultimately decreasing its output. To maintain the desired output gap,
country 2 will be forced to use its own fiscal policy to expand GDP - an unwanted solution, since
debt is welfare reducing. This scenario can aggravate if the cost of debt in such countries is too high,
generating further welfare losses. One can easily expand this result to an N country framework,
where a large economy is one that strongly affects several integrated partners through crossed
spillovers ( a1n).




which is negative since a11, a22 > 1 while a12, a21 < 1. An increase in country 2’s output gap will
induce a decrease in expenditure in country 1 - since country 2 will have to increase spending
to bring GDP up to the desired level, country 1 can ”freely” appropriate the positive spillovers,
thereby avoiding the cost of debt-fuelled expansions. Since we postulated for the existence of y∗i as
a level of GDP that is cleared of monopolistic competition (see section 3), this measure of output
gap (y∗i − ȳi) can be seen as a measure of the natural efficiency of the economy. Countries with
naturally efficient economies - yielding a consistently low output gap - will generally require a
smaller amount of fiscal stimulus. This will leave its integrated partners in a weaker position: a less
efficient economy - one that requires a larger amount of government spending - will be left to its
own means since it cannot overly depend on the few externalities from its more efficient partner.
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5 Fiscal Leadership
With Fiscal leadership we want to study how policy interactions change if x1 and x2 are exoge-
nously defined.
t=0 t=1 t=2
In t=0, expectations on inflation are formed (πe). In t=1, both countries exogenously decide on
spending (x10 and x20), given expectations (π
e) but independently of each other. In t=2, the CB
chooses its desired inflation rate based on expectations (πe) and given both values for spending
(x10 and x20).






















1 − y1)(−c) + θmλ2(y∗2 − y2)(−c) = 0
π = θm[λ1(y
∗
1 − y1)(c) + λ2(y∗2 − y2)(c)]









Equation (8) describes inflation setting by the common central bank in a context where it has
discretion over monetary policy. In this case, the CB accommodates the output gap should fiscal
policy (by itself) be unable to bring yi to the desired level. Surprise inflation can be created to affect
output and bring it to the desired level.
If both economies are already at such levels through own-country fiscal policies and spillovers,




The optimum inflation rate is also negatively affected by spending in each country ( ∂π
∂xi0
< 0).
A larger level of spending will affect output in both countries, either directly or indirectly through
the fiscal spillovers.
Considering both economies with a positive output gap, the Central Bank will always set a
positive value for inflation such that agents are surprised π > πe - thereby increasing output. An
increase in inflation expectations (πe) will generate higher actual inflation - the opportunity cost
(smaller GDP) of desinflating the economy is higher than the loss in increased inflation ( ∂π
∂πe
> 0).
Inflationary policy by the CB is chosen by considering political weights at the country-level:
λi. A country which is more heavily weighed by the CB (large λi) moving away from its desired
output level requires stronger action and, as such, cause a more hawkish response ( ∂π
∂λ1
> 0).
Figure 3 shows the above mentioned effect, considering a small calibration of the model with
π > 0, y1 < y
∗











Figure 3: Effect in π of an increase in λ1 (for a fixed x2, given x1 = x10)
As expected, for a given level of spending (x1 = x10) such that there is a positive output gap,
a larger λ1 will lead to an increase in inflation.
In the case where one of the countries (but not both) is already at the desired output (ȳ1 +
a21x2 + x1a11 = y
∗
1, y2 < y
∗






In such a situation, the degree of accommodation of the CB will depend on the relative weight
of each country. If λ2 is small enough, it is optimum for the CB to avoid committing to any
expansionary policy. The absence of surprise inflation will benefit the larger economy - country 1
- at the expense of a welfare-decreasing output gap in the smaller one. Use of fiscal policy will be
the only possible driver to achieve y∗2 , but if the cost of debt is too big a burden for country 2, or if
there is any debt ceiling, then the necessary push toward the optimum output level will not occur,
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leaving the economy further from the bliss point.
Finally, an decrease in the CB’s inflation aversion, given by an increase in θm, will have a
positive impact in the chosen inflation rate ∂π
∂θm
> 0. This solution will tend to enhance the CB’s
extent of intervention in the economy, which should benefit the smaller countries, which, in this
framework, tend to be more neglected. Figure 8 (see annex) graphically depicts this effect.
6 Discussion and application to EMU
We divide the Euro experience in two moments, both of which are well captured by our model. The
Monetary Leadership equilibrium illustrate some features of the early Euro years: the European
Central Bank is generally more conservative than the fiscal authorities, and commits to a given
inflation rate based on which policy-makers chose an appropriate (and feasible) level for spending.
Inversely, the sovereign debt crisis years (and, arguably, up to the present day) have witnessed
a greater effort by the ECB to accommodate shocks, especially in its attempt to ease borrowing
conditions for peripheral countries through non-conventional policies. Such behaviour is equally
well captured by our Fiscal Leadership equilibrium.
In the build-up to the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, peripheral EMU countries like Ireland,
Cyprus, Greece and - to some extent - Portugal (alongside some others), fuelled their growth on
increased spending Overbeek (2012) made accessible by cheap credit that ”flooded South after the
creation of the Euro” (Krugman (2012)). By 2011, the German general government deficit (as
% of GDP) had decreased 44% since 2000. Inversely, Portugal or Greece had seen their deficits
inflated by 138% and 153%, respectively. Naturally, cost of debt soared, forcing both Portugal
and Greece to ask for bailout programs in mid 2011 (as well as Cyprus, Ireland and Spain). By
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2012, the yield on Portuguese and Greek Long-term treasury bonds was up to 12,8% and 29%
respectively. Although we do not specifically model for continuous time, our model shows how
specific conditions, like large output gap differentials or significantly different degrees of inflation
aversion can contribute to permanent overspending. Given a framework of commitment by the CB
(see section 4, Monetary Leadership), debt accumulation (and the consequential rise in its cost) is
the likely result of these unbalanced equilibria.
Moreover, a study by Scheve (2004) showed that, controlling for economic performance,
preferences regarding inflation vary substantially across EMU members: German citizens have a
general inflation aversion of 0,296, compared to -0,757 for Portugal and -0,252 for Greece 3. These
results support the aforementioned conclusion that high inflation aversion in a large country will
lead to significant imbalances within a MU. This contrast not only explains how inflation can affect
GDP through decreased spending (smaller spillovers), it also sheds some light on why the ECB’s
response to the crisis was so sluggish. In a context were the CB is a second mover (see Fiscal
Leadership, section 5), we proved that the monetary authority may not want to increase inflation
if the output gap affects a small economy (small λi). In this context, it may be optimal for a
conservative CB to remain doveish, keeping inflation at bay while accepting the output gap. Only
when the crisis started to hit larger countries like Spain and Italy - yields on spanish and italian
debt started rising in late 2011/mid 2012, with rates at a maximum of 6,8% and 7%, respectively
- did the Central Bank start to act aggressively, i.e. with the ”Whatever it takes” speech by ECB
president Mario Draghi, in August 2012.
Finally, data from the OECD reveals that in the last 19 years, the average output gap in
3values are relative to inflation aversion in the UK, which explains the negative numbers although they do not
directly translate to preference for inflation
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Germany has been -0,228, comparing with -1,467 for Portugal and -3,325 for Greece (as % of
GDP). These results suggest that the German economy has a smaller ”natural” output gap vis-à-
vis its southern European partners. Lower spending in Germany may not only be explained by
high inflation aversion but, critically, by a smaller need to spend. In the long run, permanently
different output-gaps will generate a natural unbalance: underspending in one country will have
to be compensated with overspending in the others, with the effect being broader if the country
at stake is large enough. Any serious attempt at economic convergence on the union level will be
thwarted if such structural differences prove to be enduring. The problem is exacerbated due to
several fiscal constraints imposed by the SGP, particularly in the form of debt ceilings (Soukiazis
and Castro (2005)).
7 Conclusions
We develop a 2-country model of asymmetry and heterogeneity to study interactions in mone-
tary and fiscal policies in the context of a Monetary Union. A common Central Bank decides on
monetary policy through an effective rate of inflation, and fiscal policymakers chose their desired
spending. Output in both countries is affected by spillovers from their partners’ fiscal policy de-
cisions - positively in case of an expansionary fiscal policy; negatively otherwise. The 3 players
act according to a Social Loss function, positive in the output gap and in inflation. We model debt
to be welfare decreasing by adding it to the Social Loss functions in both countries, weighed by a
coefficient to represent its cost.
We find that, considering a Monetary Leadership framework - when the CB commits to a
given inflation target and both countries respond with fiscal policies - the existence of surprise
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inflation (π − πe) and of a large output gap (y∗i − ȳi) will increase spending in equilibrium. Our
results also show that received spillovers (aji, considering an analysis of country i) account for a
decrease in spending. On the other hand, an increase in the cost of debt or in inflation aversion (θi)
will typically increase spending. Increases in the fiscal multiplier (aii) will have the opposite effect.
We highlighted how the behaviour of an integrated partner can affect a country’s fiscal policy
decisions. An increase in inflation aversion in a partner country (smaller θj) as well as a decrease in
its output gap (y∗j − ȳj) will induce a spending increase in country i. We suggest that these factors
can contribute to explain the debt dynamics in Europe over the last 20 years, particularly explaining
why peripheral European nations overspent while Germany accumulated successive fiscal superav-
its. Introducing subsequent periods could be an important extension to the model, as it would shed
light on the debt-dynamic effects of our findings: continuous overspending puts pressure on bond
prices, which increases the cost of debt (βi), with an effect on the equilibrium values for spending.
In the Fiscal Leadership specification, the CB chooses its optimum inflation rate given the
exogenously chosen fiscal policies of each country. Results show that the inflation rate chosen
by the CB is positively influenced by a decrease in inflation aversion - θm - and by a decrease in
the coefficients for integration (aji and aij). Considering the existence of a positive output gap
(y∗i − yi > 0), an increase in the coefficients of integration (aij and aji) will decrease the optimum
inflation rate, given that the increased spillovers will contribute to an increase in GDP. Similarly,
an increase in spending in each country (xi and xj) will serve to decrease the chosen inflation rate,
since it positively affects output (either directly or indirectly, through spillovers).
Finally, the optimum rate of inflation also changes according to the coefficient of country
weights, λi. A very small λi will generate doveish responses by the CB, leading to very weak ac-
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commodative policies. This bias against smaller economies is a significant design flaw in the EMU,
given that the European Central Bank is, frequently, the only institution with effective ability to ex-
ecute macroeconomic policy (most of the smaller nations are constrained on the fiscal instrument
by strict debt ceilings or high cost of debt).
Our model suggests that any growth in integration - modelled as increases in aij and aji -
will be mutually beneficial only if both move simultaneously and have similar magnitudes. In the
Monetary Leadership framework, a simultaneous increase in both measures of integration will lead
to a decrease in expenditure for both countries. In the Fiscal Leadership framework, increasing
spillovers will positively affect output in both countries, inducing the CB to chose a lower rate of
inflation.
To conclude, EMU faces several challenges for the next decade. Further economic integra-
tion, particularly at the fiscal level, should be sought only if it is implemented in a coordinated man-
ner. Heterogeneity at the social level - like country-specific degrees of inflation aversion - should
be acknowledged and, over time, ought to be harmonized. Finally, the European Central Bank’s
policy-setting should be reviewed in order to mitigate the misrepresentation of smaller economies.
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Figure 8: Effect in π of an increase θm (for a fixed x2, given x1 = x10)
1. ∂x1∂x2 = −
a21
a11



















6. ∂x1∂(π0−πe) = −
c
a11
7. ∂x1∂θ1 =
2β1
θ21a
2
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8.
∂x1N
∂θ2
= − 2β2a21
θ22a22(a11a22−a12a21)
9.
∂x1N
∂(y∗2−ȳ2)
=
(y∗2−ȳ2)a21
(a21a12−a11a22)
10. ∂π∂πe =
θmc
2
1+θmc2
= θmc
2 + 1
11. ∂π∂x10
= −θmcλ1a11−λ2a12
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12. ∂π∂λ1 =
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∗
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e)]
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13. ∂π∂θm =
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